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PROSECUTORS AND THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL CASES:
AN ANALYSIS OF PLEA BARGAINING RATES
J. B. JONES-
INTRODUCTION
Increasing crime rates generate considerable
public concern over the performance of the crimi-
nal justice system. Many citizens would be shocked
to learn that the system operates on the basis of
mutual cooperation and consultation, rather than
the media image of the strident prosecutor battling
a committed defense attorney. The actual opera-
tion of the American system of criminal justice is
vastly different from the ideal adversary system.
The reality is bureaucratic bargaining.! Approxi-
mately ninety percent of all criminal cases are
resolved through the process of pre-trial negotiation
or plea bargaining.
2
Plea bargaining results from an agreement be-
tween the prosecutor, defense attorney, and ocra-
sionally the defendant. The prosecutor offers the
defendant a quid pro quo (charge reduction or sen-
tence recommendation) for pleading guilty. Plea
bargaining is a low visability process, one which
occurs in a private and informal setting. Decisions
are made over lunch or in the hallway of the
criminal court building. Moreover, the participants
wield such discretion that in most cases they serve
as the final arbiters in the sentencing decision.
The practice of plea bargaining has created con-
siderable controversy. Various study groups such
as the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Criminal Justice and the American Bar
Association have endorsed the practice, although
recommending certain reforms. 3 However, other
groups, specifically the Nixon Administration's Na-
tional Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, have argued for the abolition
of plea bargaining.' Given the prevalence of the
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of
Cincinnati: Phd. from Southern Illinois University at
Carbondale.
I A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); Skolnick,
Social Control in the Adversary System, J. CONFLICT REsO-
LUTION 52 (1962); J. EISENSTEIN, POLITICS AND THE
LEGAL PROCESS (1973).
2 D. NEWMAN, CONVIcrION, THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).
' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS (1967).
4 ABA PROJEc T ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
practice, as well as the widespread disagreement
over its use, plea bargaining merits further study
and research.5 This study examines the effect of a
prosecutor's values and social background on his
rate of plea bargaining. The findings presented
here are based on a mail survey of prosecuting
attorneys and their assistants in the state of Illinois.
6
The survey instrument contained both open-ended
and closed questions focusing primarily on the
prosecutor's plea bargaining practices and his view
of these procedures. Respondents were also asked
to supply biographical data.
The Dependent Variable
Prosecutors' responses to a question on rate of
plea bargaining provided the dependent variable
for this study. Prosecutors were requested to indi-
cate the percentage of their cases which were re-
solved through the use of a negotiated plea and the
dependent variable is based on the prosecutor's
perception of his plea bargaining rate. It was pos-
sible to make a crude check of the prosecutor's
veracity by comparing his reported rate of plea
negotiation with published figures on the percent-
age of guilty plea dispositions for his county. These
figures are included in the report of the Illinois
court administrator. Using this technique, one can
argue that the perceptions of the responding pros-
ecutors roughly correspond to reality.
While plea bargaining is the most common mode
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY
(1968).
5 Mulkey, The Role of the Prosecution and Defense in Plea
Bargaining, 3 POL'Y STUD. J. 54 (1974).
6The entire population (n = 350) of prosecuting
attorneys and their assistants was surveyed. The response
rate was forty-four percent (n = 156). Respondent rep-
resentativeness is always a problem for researchers using
a survey research methodology. However, Larry Leslie
argues that "researchers surveying issues directly related
to homogeneous groups should not be overly concerned
about the percentage of questionnaire returns. Repre-
sentativeness will most likely be excellent. This presumes,
of course, that enough responses are gained to meet
statistical assumption." Prosecutors represent a homoge-
neous group within the larger population. Leslie, Are
High Response Rates Essential to Valid Surveys? Soc. ScI.
RESEARCH 323-34 (1972). The questionnaires were
mailed in the summer of 1975.
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of case disposition throughout the United States,
variations do exist. Legal commentators have at-
tributed this variability in the use of guilty pleas to
several factors. Some suggest that variations are
the result of individual differences among prose-
cutors. 7 For example, prosecutors often weigh such
factors as the magnitude of the crime, the adequacy
of the state's evidence, the characteristics of the
defendant, and the probable defense attorney in
order to determine the costs and benefits of plea
bargaining. Differences in each prosecutor's calcu-
lations result in variations in plea bargaining rates.
Other commentators argue that the dispositional
policies of prosecutorial offices may reflect com-
munity norms and attitudes.8 In Chicago, the pros-
ecutor's office encourages plea bargaining, whereas
in Baltimore it does not. These differences reflect
variations in community attitudes toward criminal
justice or at least variations in the way prosecutors
perceive community attitudes. Furthermore, some
prosecutorial offices, have attempted to decrease
the disparity in the bargaining rates of assistants
through the establishment of plea bargaining pol-
icies. In Chicago, for instance, the supervising
state's attorney of the narcotics division developed
guidelines on the minimum sentence recommen-
dation and/or charge reductions which assistant
state's attorneys could offer in narcotics cases.9
The data on variations in plea bargaining rates
suggest that further investigation is needed. By
focusing on the prosecutor's rate of plea bargaining
as the dependent variable, it will be possible to
determine how much variation in bargaining rates
is due to independent variables such as prosecuto-
rial values and social background characteristics.
The Independent Variables
Background studies assume that the investiga-
tion of such characteristics will provide clues for
understanding decisions. This assumption is based
on the supposition that certain background char-
acteristics and experiences are conducive to partic-
ular attitudes and values which in turn influence
behavior. Although researchers have analyzed the
relationship between background traits and the
behavior of decision-makers such as legislators, bu-
reaucrats, and judges, they have yet to examine
this linkage in the case of prosecutors.'0
7 Vetri, Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to
Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
8 H. JACOB, URBAN JUSTICE 109-13 (1973).
9Gilboy, Guilty Plea Negotiations and the Exclusionary Rule
of Evidence: A Case Study of Chicago Narcotics Courts, 65 J.
CRiM. L. & C. 89-98 (1976).
1 There are numerous studies dealing with the influ-
Two background variables which appear to in-
fluence the behavior of decision-makers are edu-
cation and experience. For example, research on
social workers indicates that a formal education
can influence individual working behavior." Be-
cause common professional values are often trans-
mitted through education, the federal Welfare Ad-
ministration issued a directive in 1964 requiring
that all future public assistance workers and super-
visors have college degrees. Studies also disclose
that one's career experience affects behavior. For
instance, appellate judges with prior judicial ex-
perience were less likely to inject personal values
into their decisions than their colleagues without
prior experience on the bench.12 James Q. Wilson
maintains that the difference in styles, attitudes,
and values of politicians in Chicago, California,
and New York is partially due to the difference
between "amateurs" and "professional .politi-
cians"-differences due to experience and ambi-
tion.'3
ence of social background characteristics on political
recruitment as well as the effect of social background on
the decisions of political elites. See, e.g., S. KELLER,
BEYOND THE RULING CLASS (1963); D. MATTHEWS,
THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF DECISION-MAKERS
,(1954); D. MATTHEWS, UNITED STATES SENATORS AND
THEIR WORLD 102-17 (1960); K. PREWrIrT, THE RE-
CRUITMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS: A STUDY OF Cri-
IZEN POLITICIANS (1970). Studies have also dealt with
the effect of social background on judicial decisions. See
e.g., S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAV-
IORAL PERSPECTIVE 227-36 (1970); Adamany, The Party
Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study,
63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57 (1969); Feeley, Another Look at
the "Party' Variable" in Judicial Decision-Making: An Analysis
of the Michigan Supreme Court, 4 POLITY 91 (1971); Gold-
man, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 1961-64,
60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 374 (1966); Grossman, Social
Backgrounds andJudicial Decision-Making, 79 HARv. L. REV.
1551 (1966); Jaros & Canon, Dissent on State Suprene Court:
The Differential Effect on the Characteristics of Judges, 15
MIDWEST J. POL. Sc. 322 (1971); Ulmer, The Political
Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. PUB. L.
352 (1963); Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations
Cases in the South, 26 J. POL. 338 (1964); Bowen, The
Explanation of Judicial Voting Behavior from Sociolog-
ical Characteristics of Judges (1965) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Yale University).
11 Derthick, Intercity Differences in the Administration of the
Public Assistance Program: The Case of Massachusetts, in CITY
POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 265-66 (J. Wilson ed.
1968).
12 Nagel, Judicial Attitudes and Those of Legislators and
Administrators, in S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM
A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECrIVE 199-218 (1969). See also at
113-24 for a discussion of the influence of experience on
attorney's courtroom results.13j. WILSON, THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT, CLUB POL-
ITICS IN THREE CITIES 1-31 (1962).
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Using social characteristics as independent var-
iables indicates whether the variables which affect
the behavior of other decision-makers also exerts
an influence on prosecutors. Moreover, the discov-
ery that common variables affect several political
phenomena facilitates the integration of research
findings.
In addition to background characteristics, an-
other independent variable will be analyzed-the
prosecutor's support for organizational values pres-
ent in the criminal court environment. Social sci-
entists assert that the organizational pressures of
the criminal court and the personal goals of the
participants, induce prosecutors to value efficiency
in the courtroom and co-operation with col-
leagues.' 4 The prevalence of values such as effi-
ciency and cooperation is conducive to the use of
plea bargaining. However, researchers must still
determine the extent to which support for these
values affects variations in reported plea bargain-
ing rates. Using these values as independent vari-
ables allows the researcher to do so.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Political scientists have established that ajudge's
background characteristics affect his decisions in
certain cases.' 5 For example, Stuart Nagel observed
that a judge's ethnic or religious background pro-
vided a clue to understanding the judge's decisions
in certain types of cases.16 And, comparing the
sentencing propensities of'judges in Pittsburgh and
Minneapolis, Martin Levin found that some of the
disparities in sentences were attributable to social
background differences.17 Judges in Pittsburgh,
who came primarily from low income backgrounds
or from religious or ethnic minority groups, treated
criminal defendants on an individualistic basis.
Levin argues that because of their background,
Pittsburgh judges empathized with defendants and
attempted to give them a "break." In contrast,
Minneapolis judges, who were primarily from mid-
dle income, Northern European, Protestant back-
grounds applied universalistic criteria in sentencing
criminal defendants.
Upon this basis, one might hypothesize that
14 G. COLE, POLITICS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINALJUSTICE (1973). See also A. BLUMBERG, CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE (1967).
'5 Supra note 10.
I Nagel, Ethnic Affiliations andJudicial Propensities, 23 J.
POL. 614 (1961). Nagel, Judicial Background and Criminal
Cases, 53. J. CRIM. L.C. & P. S. 333 (1962).
17 Levin, Urban Politics and Judicial Behavior, J. LEGAL.
STUD. 193-97 (1972).
prosecutors from low status or minority back-
grounds might empathize with the defendants who
crowd the criminal courtrooms. Plea bargaining
provides one method of giving defendants a
"break," i.e., a reduction of charges or a favorable
sentence recommendation. Thus, prosecutors from
such backgrounds should engage in plea bargain-
ing more frequently.
Hypothesis 1: Prosecutors from lower class or ethnic
(Blacks, Chicanos, Eastern and Southern Europeans) and
religious Uewish and Catholic) minority groups will
engage in plea bargaining at a higher rate than their
colleagues from non-minority and middle or upper class
backgrounds.
The Langdell case method represents the pri-
mary pedagogical technique of American law
school professors.iS The originator of this method,
Christopher Columbus Langdell, contended that
the purpose of legal education was to teach stu-
dents governing legal principles. 9 He argued that
his method provided a scientific means of achieving
this knowledge. The instructor utilizing this
method presents students with a mass of appellate
court decisions attempting to engage students in a
Socratic dialogue. In this way, students learn to
analyze, distinguish, and synthesize cases. Theoret-
ically, this method teaches students to "think like
a lawyer."'
20
Despite the predominance of the casebook
method, important qualitative differences exist in
American legal education. Law schools range from
the night and part-time proprietary schools, to a
middle level often associated with state and private
universities, and finally to a group of top ranked
schools such as Harvard and Yale.2 1 While re-
18 Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379,
391 (1952).
19 Note, Modern Legal Education, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
710 (1964).
'2 ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, PRE-
LAW HANDBOOK 23 (1975).
2 Seymour WNarkov ranked 125 law schools on the
basis of entering students' scores on the Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT. See, S. WARKOV, LAWYERS IN
THE MAKING (1965). In his study Harvard and Yale were
the top-ranked schools. More recently, Peter M. Blau and
Rebecca Z. Margulies asked law school deans throughout
the country to rank the top quality law schools in the
United States. Harvard, Yale, Columbia, University of
Michigan and The University of Chicago were consist-
ently in the top five. America's Leading Professional Schools,
CHANGE 21-27 (November, 1973); A Research Replication,
The Reputation of American Professional Schools, CHANGE
42-47 (Winter, 1974-75). See also Reed, Training for the
Public Profession of Law in NEW DIRECrIONS IN LEGAL
EDUCATION 29-33, Appendix I (H. Packer & T. Ehrlich
eds. 1972).
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searchers may disagree over the criteria for ranking
law schools, they acknowledge that there are dif-
ferences between proprietary or independent law
schools and non-proprietary schools or those affili-
ated with a state or private university.2
Typically, the instruction at the proprietary law
schools stresses knowledge of precedent rather than
the method of analysis. Such schools concentrate
primarily on local and concrete law, placing em-
phasis on preparing students for the state bar
examination.2 The method of instruction is gen-
erally straight lecturing, with little discussion of the
political, social, or economic aspects of a particular
case. Moreover, the faculty members tend to be
private practitioners who teach on a part-time
basis.
Ladinsky and Lortie found that the nature of
one's legal education affected career patterns.
24
Students from proprietary law schools were much
more likely to become solo practitioners than stu-
dents from nonproprietary law schools. Addition-
ally, law firms rarely recruited candidates from
proprietary law schools, on the assumption that
such candidates lacked the skills needed to handle
complex legal problems. Confirmation of these
findings is provided in a more recent study of the
Chicago Bar. Heinz, et. al., discovered that firm
lawyers were disproportionately drawn from elite
schools (Harvard and Yale), while solo practition-
ers were more often graduates of local schools
(Loyola, DePaul, John Marshall, Kent). s
Furthermore, Smigel observed that Wall Street
law firms placed considerable emphasis on recruit-
ing students from particular law schools; students
educated in elite schools, were expected to have
obtained both the values and expertise needed to
represent .high status clients.2 6 This reasoning as-
sumes that students assimilate the values and per-
spectives which are a part of their training. Draw-
22 A. BLAusrEIN & C. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAW.
YER 176-79 (1954).
2 Lortie, Laymen to Lawmen: Law Schools, Careers, and
Professional Socialization, 29 HARv. EDuC. REV. 352
(1959).
24 Lortie, supra note 23, at 357-59; Ladinsky, The Impact
of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practice and the Law,
16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127 (1973). See also Ladinsky, Careers
of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions, 28 AM. SoC.
REV. 47 (1963).
2 Heinz, Laumann, Cappell, Halliday, and Schaal-
man, Diversity, Representation, and Leadership in an Urban
Bar: A First Report on a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 3 AM. BAR
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 717 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Heinz].2 6
E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER (1964).
ing an analogy to proprietary legal education, one
might hypothesize that the proprietary law school
with its emphasis on the rules of a particular
jurisdiction, would produce students with a myopic
perspective of the legal system. Such students may
fail to appreciate the more philosophical issues of
the adversary system and the rule of law. In con-
trast, students attending nonproprietary schools in
which analysis and method are stressed would be
more inclined to have a broader perspective of the
legal system and more likely to support the rule of
law and the adversary system.
What effect would these differences have on the
reported plea bargaining rates of prosecutors? One
might assume that prosecutors trained in the pro-
prietary law schools would adapt more readily to
the norms of the criminal court organization than
prosecutors from nonproprietary schools. This is
particularly true since lawyers from nonproprietary
schools may view plea bargaining as conflicting
with the ideals of the adversary system and the rule
of law.
27
Hypothesis 2: Prosecutors, who receive their legal edu-
cation from one of the proprietary law schools, will engage
in plea bargaining at a higher rate than their counterparts
from nonproprietary law schools.
Beyond his law school training, the lawyer's
work environment often shapes his behavior.s For
instance, Heinz, et. al., argue that one reason for
the overrepresentation of large firm lawyers in the
Chicago Bar Association, is that these law firms
encourage bar association membership. 29 This oc-
curs because participants in most organizations
share certain norms or expectations about the be-
havior of individuals within the organization. In
the criminal court, researchers found that plea
bargaining norms supporting stability in the crim-
inal court organization persist largely because these
norms are transmitted to new recruits."a
Socialization to the norms of the court occurs in
several ways. Beverly Blair Cook observed that
seminars for new judges are significant socializing
agents for federal district court judges.3 1 Carp and
Wheeler discovered that fellow judges, lawyers,
and members of the court staff also played a role
2' Comment, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
28J. SKOLNICK. JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, ch. 3
(1966).
2 Heinz, supra note 25, at 735.
30 CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW and POLrrICS 189-90 (G.
Cole, ed. 1976).
3i Cook, The Socialization of New FederalJudges: Impact on
District Court Business, 1971 WASH. L. Q. 253.
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in the socialization of newly appointed federal
judges.32 Additionally, appointees with prior judi-
cial experience had fewer adjustment problems
than judges without this experience. Apparently,
the more experience one has within an organiza-
tion, the more likely it is that he will adhere to the
norms of that organization.
Hypothesis 3: Prosecutors with more legal experience will
engage in plea bargaining at a higher rate than those with
less experience.
Milton Rokeach suggests that values serve as
standards or criteria for one's actions. In Rokeach's
words, "To say that a person 'has a value' is to say
that he had an enduring belief that a specific mode
of conduct or end-state of existence is personally
and socially preferable to alternative modes of
conduct or end-states of existence."
'3
The values or preferences which govern the con-
duct of actors in the criminal court organization
include co-operation with colleagues and concern
for efficiency. According to Abraham Blumberg,
the criminal court organization "co-opts" its par-
ticipants so that they favor organizational values
such as efficiency and production.34 He maintains
that concern for administrative efficiency overrides
concern for individual rights. In this context, Jer-
ome Skolnick argues that most criminal attorneys
will attempt to compromise.35 He notes that the
nature of American criminal justice encourages the
development of informal relationships between the
prosecution and defense. Co-operation occurs be-
cause participants want to avoid conflict.
Co-operation also makes it possible for prosecu-
tors to advance personal goals. Both prosecutors
and their assistants often view their positions as a
vehicle for gaining valuable trial experience before
entering private practice.36 They are anxious to
make contacts within the legal community which
will later prove helpful. Some are also seeking to
develop a professional reputation, because this fa-
cilitates a future private practice.3 7 While it is
'3 Carp & Wheeler, Sink or Swim: The Socialization of a
Federal DistrictJudge, 21 J. PUB. L. 360 (1972).
3 M. ROKEACH, BELIEFS, ATrrTUDES, AND VALUES
159-60 (1968).
'* A. BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 45-71; G. COLE,
POLITICS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL Jus-
TrCF 193-204 (1973).
5 Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J.
CONFLICT RFSOLUrION 52 (1967).
w P. Nardulli, Organizational Influences Upon Deci-
sion-Making in the Chicago Felony Court System 22-25
(Paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Asso-
ciation Meeting, Chicago, Illinois) (May, 1975).
17 D. NEtBAUER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MIDDLE
AMERICA 51-52 (1975).
important for prosecutors to appear as formidable
opponents, it is more important that they demon-
strate an ability to compromise and adapt to the
norms of the criminal court system. Moreover, plea
bargaining also benefits the politically ambitious
prosecutor or assistant, because it assures a high
conviction rate. A high conviction rate provides
evidence that the prosecutor is doing his job and
establishes a record of success which the prosecutor
can refer to in subsequent election campaigns.
Consequently, plea bargaining facilitates both per-
sonal and organizational goals.
Hypothesis 4: Prosecutors who adhere most strongly to
values such as efficiency and cooperation will engage in
plea bargaining at a higher rate than those prosectors who
support these values less strongly.
The following (Figure 1) is a graphic represen-
tation of the model utilized in this research. While
the focus of this research is on arrows 1, 2, 3 and 4,
it is likely that the relationships indicated by 5, 6
and 7 are also significant. Each of the relationships
in 1, 2, 3 and 4 will be evaluated through correla-
tional analysis. Additionally, the combined effect
of the independent variables on reported plea bar-
gaining rates will be explored through the use of
multiple regression analysis.
RESuLTs
The hypothesis (H 1) was that prosecutors from
ethnic and religious minority groups or lower status
backgrounds would be more likely to engage in
plea bargaining. Because these individuals are from
less advantaged or minority backgrounds, it was
hypothesized that they would sympathize with
defendants. Plea bargaining would provide a way
of individualizing justice and giving defendants "a
break". On the other hand, it was hypothesized
that prosecutors from non-minority or middle or
high status backgrounds would be less concerned
with individualizing justice and more concerned
with strict adherence to the rule.of law. Therefore,
to some extent, they would be less likely to engage
in plea negotiations than their colleagues.
Table 1 reports the association between two
social background variables (religion and national
origin) and the dependent variable (reported rate
of plea bargaining).3 8 Eta in Table 1 ranges from
.06 to .11. Such low scores signify a very weak
as Religion and national origin are categorical vari-
ables. The categories utilized for analysis include: religion
(Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other, and no preference);
national origin (Northern and Western European, South-
ern and East European, Middle East, North American,
and other).
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SIMPIE ASSOCIATION EM PIZU10M' SOCIAL
BACKGW= AND REPM P=EA BARGAINN RXAES
Dependent Religion National Father's
Variables Bi
(eta)
Percentage of .Ii .06 -. 03
all cases re- (1 3 2)a (121) (129)
solved throgh
plea bargaining
aNafbers in parentheses are the naibers upn which the correlations are
calculated.
relationship between a prosecutor's religion or na-
tional origin and his reported rate of plea negoti-
ation. Also present in Table 1 is the correlation
between the prosecutor's family status (operation-
alized as father's occupation) and his rate of plea
bargaining. The correlation (rho) is low (-.03),
which implies that the prosecutor's family status is
not associated with his plea bargaining rate.
9
The statistical analyses demonstrate that knowl-
edge of the prosecutor's religion, national origin, or
family status is not useful in predicting his rate of
plea bargaining. Prosecutors from low status or
minority and ethnic backgrounds do not bargain
more frequently than prosecutors from high status
or non-minority religious and ethnic backgrounds.
a7 The measurement scale used for father's occupation
is a modified version of the one developed by Alba
Edwards. See A. EDWARDS, COMPARATIVE OCCUPA-
TIONAL STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1943).
One explanation for this finding may be that many
prosecutors and judges, regardless of individual
origin, look to the upper-middle class as their ref-
erence group.' As Jacob states, "Many (prosecu-
tors and judges) look forward to where they would
like their own children to be rather than backward
to where they spent their own childhoods.' 141 If this
is the case, then many prosecutors from minority
religious or ethnic backgrounds may be emulating
their higher status peers. Consequently, back-
ground variables would not explain a prosecutor's
propensity to engage in plea bargaining. These
results, therefore, do not support Hypothesis 1.
The next hypothesis (H 2) is that prosecutors
who received their legal training from proprietary
law schools would engage in plea bargaining more
4o H. JACOB, supra note 8, at 78-79.




SIMPLE ASSOCIATICN FOR PRCSEC)t5RS'
LMAL E TION AND REPCM'M PLEA. BA u FATES
Dependent Variable Legai Education
(eta)
Perrentage of all cases .10
resolved through plea (136)
a
bargaining
aNurers in parentheses are the nuaters upm utdch the correlations are
calculated.
Table 3
SIMPLE ASSOCTIATICN EM PaCGERS'EXPERIENC AND rEPTRM= PLEA BA&N RUME
Depen t Variable E eri (Pearson's R)
Percentage of all cases .07
resolved through the use (n = 13 5 )a
of plea bargaining
a!umbers in parentheses are the numbers upon which the correlations are
calculated.
frequently than prosecutors who attended nonpro-
prietary law schools.4 2 Table 2 demonstrates the
strength of the relationship between type of law
school training and the prosecutor's reported rate
of bargaining. The reported statistic (eta = .10)
suggests that the prosecutor's legal training
(whether he attended a proprietary or nonproprie-
tary law school) has a minor effect on his rate of
plea-negotiation. The fact that one's legal training
seems to have little, if any, influence on plea bar-
gaining rates could be due in part to the realities
of the criminal justice system.
Critics of legal education argue that law students
receive a distorted picture of reality.3 Casebooks,
they assert, cannot convey the true nature of crim-
inal law practice. Although knowledge of the crim-
inal law is essential, experience provides one with
a greater understanding of the way the courts and
the prosecutor's office operate. Students, depend-
ing on their legal training, may subscribe to adver-
42 Proprietary law schools included in the survey were:
John Marshall, Kent I.I.T., and Detroit College of Law.
All other law schools were included in the nonproprietary
category.
43 L. FORER, THE DEATH OF THE LAW 376-93 (1975).
sary ideals in varying degrees. But, once faced with
a system which functions'almost completely on the
basis of informal negotiations, the new recruit re-
gardless of his training learns to adjust to the
system. Reality may override law school values and
perceptions and therefore, we find little support for
Hypothesis 2.
The correlation (Pearson's R) between the pros-
ecutor's legal experience (operationalized as the
number of years in the practice of law) and his
reported rate of bargaining is presented in Table
3. It was hypothesized (H 3) that prosecutors with
more legal experience will engage in plea bargain-
ing at a higher rate than those with less experience.
But, legal experience, as the low correlation implies
(.07), has almost no influence on the prosecutor's
rate of bargaining. There tends to be minimal
differences betweei the experienced prosecutor and
the inexperienced prosecutor in terms of the re-
ported frequency of plea bargaining. This does not
imply that differences in the concessions a prose-
cutor is willing to make do not exist. For example,
Albert Alschuler argues that experienced and in-
experienced prosecutors differ in respect to the
types of concessions they are willing to grant. Al-
[Vol. 69
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Table 4
SDVIU ASSO=TIt FOR PRSEnURS' A ME T
ORGNIZATIONAL VAUES AND IREW PLEA BA RATES
Dependent Index of Inde of
Variables r
Percentage of all
cases resolved throuh .05 .12
plea bargaining (1 35 )a (135)
aNumbers in parentheses are the nurs upon whid the correlations are
schuler found that fear of losing a case as well as a
lack of confidence, often led inexperienced prose-
cutors to offer greater concessions than the merits
of a case justified."
Another factor which may account for the failure
of experience to predict increases or decreases in
plea bargaining rate is the lack of variation in the
independent variable. Because there were few ex-
perienced prosecutors in the survey, it is difficult
to determine the exact effect of experience on the
prosecutor's propensity to bargain.
The failure of social background, law school
training, and experience to predict plea bargaining
rates is not particularly surprising. Evidence from
studies dealing with the effect of social background
variables on judicial decision-making is also incon-
clusive.4 5 In most instances, background variables
"Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 110-11 (1968).
' One characteristic recognized as influencing a
judge's decision is religion. See S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL
PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPEcrIVE 227-36
(1969); Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Court of
Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 374 (1966);
Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the
South, 26 J. POL. 338 (1964). Partisan identification also
has been found to be associated with a judge's voting
behavior. See, Jaros and Canon, Dissent on State Supreme
Court: The Differential Effect of the Characteristics of Judges,
15 MIDWESTJ. POL. Sci. 332 (1971); Ulmer, The Political
Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. PUB. L.
352 (1963). See also Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges'
Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 62 AM. POL. SCL
REv. 57 (1969); Feeley, Another Look at the "Party Variable"
in Judicial Decision-Making: An Analysis of the Michigan
Supreme Court, 4 POLITY 91 (1971); Nagel, Multiple Corre-
lations ofJudicial Backgrounds and Decisions, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 258 (1974). For a general discussion of the use of
social background variables as predictors of judicial de-
cisions, see, S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL
COURrS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 174-78 (1976); W.
were only indirectly related to individual behavior
and were actually the precursors of certain atti-
tudes and values which are more directly influen-
tial in predicting behavior.46 This appears to be
true for prosecutors as well. As Eisenstein and
Jacob point out, background characteristics of
prosecutors and defense attorneys influence their
experiences and perceptions, and may indirectly
influence the disposition of criminal cases. How-
ever, the norms and actions of the collective court-
room work group (prosecutors and defense attor-
neys and judges) mute the role of these personal
biases.
47
The data arrayed in Table 4 show the relation-
ship between the prosecutor's support or non-sup-
port for efficiency in the courtroom, co-operation
with colleagues, and plea bargaining iates.4 It was
MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAw
103-12 (1972).
46 Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Court of
Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 496 (1975).
47J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE 10- 11
(1977).
4 The independent variables, efficiency and coopera-
tion, represent an index which measures the extent to
which prosecutors support these values. The indices are
based on answers to a series of Likert scale questions
dealing with efficiency and cooperation. These questions
were factor analyzed in order to determine which best
measured the underlying values of efficiency and coop-
eration. The following two items (which loaded between
.631 and .592 on the first factor) were selected for the
index of cooperation: 1) the real job of the defense
attorney is to negotiate a plea for his client. 2) the real
job of the prosecutor is to negotiate with the defense
attorney. These two items (which loaded between .421
and .482) were selected for the efficiency index: 1) Pros-
ecutors (public defenders) need to dispose of their cases
as quickly as possible. 2) The efficient handling of cases
is of foremost importance in the criminal justice system.
On the basis of their answers to these questions on
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hypothesized (H 4) that as adherence to such values
increased, the prosecutor's reported rate of bargain-
ing would also increase.
The correlations (Pearson's R) reveal that sup-
port or non-support for efficiency has almost no
effect on plea bargaining rates, but that support
for co-operation has a somewhat greater influence
on the frequency of prosecutorial plea bargaining.
Bargaining rates increase as support for co-opera-
tion increases, although the correlation is rather
weak.
Neither organizational value is particularly help-
ful in predicting the frequency of prosecutorial
plea bargaining. Several factors could explain this:
first, support for co-operation is a goal which pros-
ecutors are reluctant to articulate, largely because
the public views this goal as illegitimate.4 9 Thus,
the responding prosecutors may have been reluc-
tant to indicate the extent of their support for co-
operation. Second, these values could be only in-
directly related to the rate of negotiation: support
for such values may encourage the development of
policy guidelines for handling cases which have a
more direct impact on reported bargaining rates.
For example, Eckart and Stover noted that public
defenders and prosecutors followed certain rules of
thumb in the disposition of felony cases. ° First
offenders might have their charges reduced to mis-
demeanors, or defendants facing multiple felony
charges may automatically have all but one of the
charges dismissed. Although the rules will vary
depending on the jurisdiction, each case is treated
according to the established rule for that particular
category of cases.
Eisenstein and Jacob discovered that policy
norms on plea negotiation also existed both in the
Cook County State's Attorney's office and in De-
troit (Wayne County).5 ' Failure to comply with
official policy in Cook County resulted in discipli-
nary action. Violators were often called to the
supervisor's office and required to explain their
behavior.
Such policies would encourage more plea bar-
efficiency and co-operation, the prosecutors received a
cumulative score. Low scores indicate weak adherence to
the values, while high scores indicate strong adherence to
the values. Medium range scores represent a neutral
category. The Pearson's correlation between efficiency
and co-operation is (.16) which indicates that these indi-
ces represent two different value dimensions.
49J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 47, at 28.
5o Eckart & Stover, Public Defenders and Routinized Crim-
inal Defense Processes, 51 J. URB. L. 665 (1974).
'I J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 47, at chs. 5
& 6.
gaining because they provide a method of settling
cases with minimum conflict and expenditure of
resources. Such policies may reflect support for
efficiency and co-operation, but the linkage be-
tween these values and plea bargaining rates may
be indirect, thereby accounting for the low corre-
lations reported.
Thus far, the correlational analysis demonstrates
that each of the independent variables has a slight
effect on reported plea bargaining rates. One short-
coming of such bivariate analysis is that it does not
allow the researcher to account for the simultane-
ous effect of several independent variables on the
dependent variable. Nor does it permit the re-
searcher to hold constant other independent vari-
ables which can affect the initial relationship under
analysis. One way of ascertaining the collective
effect of these variables is through a multiple
regression analysis. This mode of analysis also gives
the researcher an idea of the unique effect of each
independent variable, while controlling for all
other independent variables.
5 2
The results of a multiple regression analysis are
revealed in Table 5. The four independent vari-
ables used in the analysis were: adherence to co-
operation, father's occupation, experience, and
proprietary law school attendance.5 The squared
multiple correlation coefficient (R square) gives
the researcher an indication as to how much of the
variation in the dependent variable is accounted
for by the independent variables in the analysis.
The R squared in this instance is .06. In other
words, these particular independent variables ex-
plain about six percent of the variance in prose-
cutors' reported plea bargaining rates. Thus, the
52 Several assumptions are required for such an anal-
ysis. The assumptions are: 1) a linear relationship exists
between the independent and the dependent variables,
2) the data are normally distributed and the independent
variables are not substantially correlated with one an-
other. See, F. KELLEY, D. BEGGS, & K. MCNEIL, RE-
SEARCH DESIGN IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: MUL-
TIPLE REGRESSION APPROACH (1969).
" The variable proprietary law school attendance was
used in the regression analysis as a dummy variable.
Scores of 1 were assigned if a respondent attended a
proprietary law school and 0 if he did not. The use of a
dummy variable allows a researcher to utilize a nominal
level variable in the regression analysis. For a discussion
of the use of dummy variables, see, H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL
STATISTICS, 498-501 (1972). Father's occupation is an
ordinal level scale. For a discussion of ordinal and di-
chotomized variables in regression analysis see Tanen-
hais. et. aL., The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction-Cue
Theor, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (G. Schubert ed.
1963).
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Figure 2 A model of the dispositional process in the criminal court.
combined influence of these particular indepen-
dent variables on prosecutorial bargaining rates is
not particularly high.
Also reported in Table 5 are the standardized
regression coefficients (Betas). These demonstrate
the relative contribution of each independent var-
iable, while controlling for the other independent
variables. Experience is the most important vari-
able affecting the prosecutor's rate of bargaining,
but it is only slightly more important than pro-
prietary law school attendance and support for co-
operation. Father's occupation has the least effect
on the reported rate of bargaining.
CONCLUSION
Does a prosecutor's background or support for
organizational values influence his plea bargaining
rate? To some extent, yes. However, given the large
amount of unexplained variance in the dependent
variable, it is obvious that additional factors ac-
count for variation in reported plea bargaining
rates. Certainly, additional research is needed.
Lawrence Mohr argues that the criminal courts
can be better understood if one looks at the behav-
ior of the participants within the framework of a
decision-making paradigm.54 Following Mohr's
suggestion, the model in Figure 2 represents a
general outline of the various factors which influ-
ence the decision to go to trial or to negotiate a
plea.
Social scientists often construct models to assist
them in theory-building. A model, according to
Lawrence Mayer, is an analytical system that is
"developed or constructed so that the logical rela-
tionships between its elements correspond in logical
form to the relationships between a set of elements
in the real world."' Models then, simplify reality
and, in performing this function, allow researchers
to isolate certain variables for analysis. Moreover,
they serve a heuristic function, suggesting new
relationships which logically ought to exist. When
these relationships have survived empirical testing,
"the task of logically integrating the lawlike prop-
ositions generated from the model into theory is
facilitated."56
M Mohr, Organizations, Decisions, and Courts, 10 LAw &
Soc'y REV. 621 (1976).
5 L. MAYER, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INQUIRY 52
(1972).
5 L. MAYER, supra note 55, at 53.
PROS/PD/ATTY PROS/PD/ATTY
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The model in Figure 2 depicts the institutional
and environmental factqrs which affect the prose-
cutor's decision to plea bargain or go to trial. The
findings of this research, as well as that of Cole,
Skolnick, Blumberg, Jacob and Eisenstein, suggest
that institutional variables such as the participants'
social background, education, values, ability, sen-
tencing propensities and goals, are indirectly pre-
dictive of case disposition.
57
Additional institutional factors which are sig-
nificant include the circumstances surrounding a
particular case, i.e., the strength of the state's evi-
dence; the seriousness of the crime, felony or mis-
demeanor; personal characteristics of the defend-
ant; judicial pressure to clear the court docket; and
the defendant's willingness to accept the plea
agreement.
Administrative factors also effect the disposition
process. Variables such as the volume of cases
handled in a particular jurisdiction, the length of
time that a case has been on the docket, the number
of cases per attorney, and the presence of a profes-
sional court administrator all influence disposi-
tions. In addition to these administrative factors,
environmental or external forces also play an in-
direct role in determining the disposition of cases.
For example, the nature of the criminal law (state
or federal) or the social, political, and economic
characteristics of a particular state or locality, are
all variables which potentially affect the operation
of the criminal court. Researchers have generally
tended to ignore this aspeci of the model, but it is
important nonetheless. Courts do not operate in a
vacuum; they are best understood in an environ-
mental context. Thus, it is necessary for researchers
to examine the effect of crime rate, public opinion,
or media pressure on the criminal court operation.
The model suggests that it is the interaction
among the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge
(indirectly) which determines the final outcome of
the case. Attorneys assimilate the available infor-
mation and attempt to estimate the likely outcome
of a case; that is, what will occur if the case goes to
trial as opposed to what will happen if the case is
settled through a negotiated plea. This judgment,
in a sense, acts as a filter through which attorneys
process information surrounding individual cases.
Often this judgment may simply reflect the estab-
lished policy for disposing of particular cases. For
instance, some prosecutor's offices refuse to bargain
in certain types of cases-drug cases or carrying a
concealed weapon. This type of policy would have
an influence on case disposition.
Participants in the decision-making process must
weigh institutional factors such as individual val-
ues, goals, and abilities along with the circum-
stances of the case and the defendant's willingness
to accept a particular agreement. All of these fac-
tors, as well as external factors, are considered in
making a final decision on trial or negotiation. Past
experience influences an attorney's estimates of a
case outcome as well. Moreover, such past experi-
ences serve as the basis for developing policy guide-
lines on case disposition. Thus, the interaction
among those involved both directly (prosecutors
and defense attorneys) and indirectly (judges and
defendants) results in a decision on case disposition.
The model requires several caveats. First, it needs
refinement to determine more specifically what the
circumstances are for trial disposition rather than
negotiating a plea. In other words, it must consider
which of the institutional or environmental factors
are weighed more heavily in the final decision to
go to trial or to negotiate. Second, further testing
of the model should take into consideration differ-
ences in plea bargaining styles. It must question
whether the kinds of concessions which are made
in particular jurisdictions (charge reduction, sen-
tence reduction, or modification of conviction la-
bel) effect the decision to negotiate or go to trial.
Moreover, researchers should not assume that the
model operates in the same fashion in all jurisdic-
tions. Comparisons across jurisdictions are neces-
sary in order to determine the common factors
which influence case disposition. This model pro-
vides a starting point for future research, for it
identifies a number of relationships which need
empirical testing. Proceeding in this fashion will
allow researchers to develop a theory of plea bar-
gaining.57 See notes 1, 14, 35 and 36 supra.
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